Who Is This For? Naming Beneficiaries and Policy Support
Job Market Paper
The legitimacy of political reforms depends on public acceptance, yet trust in government is fragile and even policies with a strong efficiency case can meet resistance. Governments and political movements alike emphasize who a policy is for, but we know little about what such claims do. I study this in a natural field experiment embedded in official government communication. The City of Cologne reallocated most of a district’s curb space from open access to resident-only parking, and half all affected households received a version of the announcement letter with one added sentence stating that the new rules give residents priority. Using the permit register and a survey five months later, I find no effect on permit uptake, application timing, willingness to pay, or perceived search time. However, the sentence raised the share of residents who definitely support the reform (from 46 to 61 percent), who definitely regard it as fair (from 48 to 60 percent), and shifted applicants toward two-year permits by 14 percentage points. The effects on support and fairness are similar in size when the same residents evaluate the same reform in a district where they would be excluded. With the reform and its performance held fixed, the pattern is consistent with the sentence changing normative judgments, rather than attention or expected private benefits: explicitly naming who a reform is for raises the legitimacy of a policy at zero marginal cost.
Draft available here.
with J. Alfitian, B. Langer, S. O. Schneider, and M. Sutter
In a randomized field experiment with various firms in Germany, we study the potential of feedback on machine utilization to increase productivity. We assign production departments to a control group or one of two treatments of increasing intensity for 13 weeks. In the first treatment, workers receive weekly feedback on machine utilization, in a graphical display introduced in a kick-off workshop. In the second treatment, an extended workshop led by a lean management consultant and weekly review meetings with supervisors complement the weekly graphical feedback overview. Preliminary results indicate that feedback increases productivity overall, particularly under the more intensive treatment. However, effects vary considerably across firms. Using an endline survey of machine operators, we aim to shed light on the mechanisms underlying these effects.
with S. Boonmanunt, W. Kilenthong, and M. Sutter
This study examines how caregivers' economic preferences, personality traits, parental investment, unhealthy behaviors, parental absence, and household composition are associated with children's cognitive and non-cognitive development. We analyze primary panel data from 1,078 children aged 0–50 months and their caregivers in socioeconomically disadvantaged regions of Thailand. Combining standardized assessments of developmental milestones across five domains with detailed caregiver profiles, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of early childhood development. We document three main findings. First, developmental delays are widespread. Second, exploiting the panel data structure of our data, we uncover substantial heterogeneity beneath aggregate trends. Third, caregivers’ time and material investment are the most robustly associated predictors of developmental outcomes, whereas economic preferences, personality traits, and parental absence show little to no direct association once investment is controlled for. Modeling investment decisions reveals that social preferences, extraversion, and household wealth predict investment behavior, suggesting that caregiver’s characteristics operate indirectly through investment, rather than directly. These results identify key behavioral mechanisms underlying early childhood development and provide guidance for designing interventions that target the proximate drivers of parental investment in resource-constrained settings.
Human Capital Development Seminar, Research Institute for Policy Evaluation and Design, UTCC Bangkok
Experimetrics and Behavioral Economics Workshop CIMEO, Sapienza University Rome, Soleto
MPI-CREEED Workshop, CREEED University Amsterdam, and Max Planck Institute, Bonn
EEG Workshop in Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute, Bonn
Behaviorally Smart Institutions, IMPRS Summer School, Ellwangen
Empirical Analysis of Social and Legal Institutions, IMPRS Topics Workshop, University of Bologna
Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Summer School by the European Economics Review in Crete
RCTs in the Social Sciences, Summer School, University of Stavanger
MPI-NHH Workshop, Max Planck Institute, Bonn, and FAIR NHH, Bergen
Credence Goods, Behavior and Incentives, Winter School and (Un-)ethical Behavior in Markets, Summit, University of Innsbruck
Behaviorally Smart Institutions, IMPRS Summer School, Bamberg
IMPRS-UPF Topics Workshop, University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
Experimental and Behavioral Economics Workshop, Ca’ Foscari University, Venice
Behaviorally Smart Institutions, IMPRS Summer School, Konstanz